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18 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
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 20 CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA  
 21  
 22 WESTERN DIVISION

23 ALEXIS HOLYWEEK SAREI, et al.,  
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 25 Plaintiffs,  
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 27 v.  
 28 RIO TINTO, plc. et al.,  
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 30 Defendants.

No. 00-11695 MMM AIJx  
 DECLARATION OF YAUKA ALUAMBO  
 LIRIA

I, Yauka Aluambo Liria, hereby declare as follows:

1. My name is Mr. Yauka Aluambo Liria of Tunda village, Pangia District, Southern Highlands Province, Papua New Guinea. I currently reside in Port Moresby, Papua New Guinea.

1           2.     I served in the PNG Defense Force (PNGDF) from 1981 to  
2 August 1993. Over the period May - September 1989, I served in the  
3 Bougainville military operations as the Contingent Intelligence  
4 Officer based at the Panguna mine site township during the first  
5 deployment of troops and at the onset of the Bougainville crisis in  
6 1989. In 1993 I published a book entitled 'The Bougainville  
7 Campaign Diaries' based on my experiences at Panguna as an  
8 Intelligence Officer for the PNGDF.

9           3.     Between early 1999 and early 2000, I was employed by the  
10 Department of Prime Minister and National Executive Council (Dept  
11 of PM & NEC) of the Papua New Guinea Government. More  
12 specifically, I was employed by the National Intelligence  
13 Organization (NIO), which is a division of the Dept of PM & NEC. In  
14 NIO, I was employed as a "Research Officer". In NIO I was the  
15 officer responsible for working on all Bougainville Crisis matters,  
16 including general research work, Peace Talks processes, BRA  
17 activities and generally monitoring and assessing all matters and  
18 developments relating to the Bougainville Peace Process during that  
19 time.

20           4.     The first section of this statement describes the conduct  
21 and activities I saw or personally participated in during the  
22 military operations over the period of May-September 1989. The  
23 second section of this statement describes the effect this  
24 litigation has had and could have on the implementation of the  
25 Bougainville Peace Agreement based on my experiences.

26 Military Operation  
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1           5.     The military operations on Bougainville were carried out  
2 by the PNGDF and the Royal PNG Constabulary (PNGGC).

3           6.     The list below shows how Bougainville Copper Limited  
4 (BCL) was actively involved in supporting and/or facilitating the  
5 PNGDF's and RPNGC's military operations against the Bougainville  
6 people.

7           6.1     BCL provided the building up of all their facilities  
8                   (e.g. telephone and electricity) for the "command  
9                   post" (or the tactical headquarters) of the PNGDF  
10                   Task Force in Panguna. The Battalion headquarters  
11                   was set up inside a BCL building No. Block 4 at the  
12                   top floor. In this building, we were also provided  
13                   with BCL telephone services for speedy  
14                   communications with army higher headquarters at  
15                   Murray Barracks, Port Moresby and BCL washing  
16                   machines for laundry services. This building was  
17                   also used to accommodate the tactical headquarters  
18                   of staff, which numbered some twenty to thirty  
19                   personnel. The floors 1-3 were used by other staff  
20                   and workers of BCL, including contracted expatriate  
21                   workers. We, the PNGDF, were sharing the BCL  
22                   building with the BCL workers.  
23                   The provision of this building (Block No.4) was  
24                   important for the military operations because it  
25                   provided reliable telephone and facsimile  
26                   communications to army headquarters at Murray  
27                   Barracks in Port Moresby; it provided personal  
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1 safety and comfort to headquarter troops at Panguna,  
2 which improved morale and effected on the overall  
3 successful workings of the tactical headquarters at  
4 Panguna; and it provided security by the presence of  
5 the BCL workers and the physical structure of the  
6 building and lighting, which improved morale and  
7 effected on the overall successful workings of the  
8 tactical headquarters at Panguna.

9 6.2 BCL also provided other buildings to accommodate  
10 troops returning from field and combat operations,  
11 either wounded or for rest and recuperation. BCL  
12 also provided buildings for our logistics support  
13 unit to store and issue on demand critical combat  
14 supplies including ammunition, combat clothing and  
15 equipment, rations, medical kits, tents and assorted  
16 combat supplies. These facilities included Kusito  
17 camp (for troop accommodations) and Camp 10 (for  
18 logistic support unit).

19 6.3 Three BCL messes were made available for the PNGDF  
20 troops at Panguna to use. They included Kawerong  
21 Mess, Kusito Mess, and another mess near Panguna  
22 Community School. Messes were used together with the  
23 BCL workers and staff. (Troops did not pay for the  
24 meals).

25 This was an important BCL support for the PNGDF  
26 operations. Excellent BCL accommodation and food  
27 significantly boosted the troop's morale.  
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- 6.4 Many BCL vehicles were used for mobile patrols around Panguna and the vicinity and also for the combat operations against the Bougainville rebels. We at the tactical headquarters had several BCL vehicles and each rifle company (combat fighting group) had one BCL supplied vehicle allocated to them for their operational use.
- 6.5 BCL also supplied fuel (petrol and diesel) for all the vehicles we used at Panguna. We refilled at the BCL pump stations at Loloho and at Panguna (on the hill near camp 10). We, the soldiers, never paid for refueling.
- 6.6 The BCL communications system at Panguna was also made available for the military operations. This included BCL telephones, facsimile machines, photocopiers and "walkie-talkie" radios. Walkie-talkie radios provided extremely useful, tactically, for close-range communications to the scattered patrols around the Panguna military operational area.
- 6.7 BCL Hospital - BCL's hospital at the Panguna mine site was also made available for the military to use. This facility gave life-saving treatment for wounded troops (in combat around Panguna mine).

25 Troops wounded in combat were rescued by BCL

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supplied vehicles or helicopters and rushed to this

1 hospital for recovery and sent back to the battle  
2 fields when well enough.

3  
4 6.8 BCL Helicopters - BCL also assisted the military  
5 operations by providing its helicopters for military  
6 "combat operations", which included field  
7 reconnaissance trips, casualty evacuation, troop  
8 insertion into combat zones, troop extraction from  
9 field to Panguna, and supply of combat critical  
10 supplies (e.g. ammunition) to troops in the fields  
11 around Panguna. BCL helicopters were flown by BCL  
12 pilots, using the BCL Helipad below Camp 10 (at  
13 Panguna) and supported by staff of the helicopter  
14 division who were all BCL workers or companies  
15 contracted by BCL.

16 6.9 Secretarial Work - BCL headquarters at a place  
17 called "Pink Palace" at Panguna also provided  
18 secretarial work for the Tactical Headquarters. For  
19 example, my intelligence reports were typed out by  
20 the BCL girls in the "Pink Palace". BCL  
21 administration managed and gave the instructions for  
22 the secretaries to do our work (secretarial work).

23 6.10 Involvement of BCL Staff - Some of the BCL staff who  
24 were directly involved in the military operations  
25 were helicopter pilots and BCL Panguna hospital  
26 staff. BCL helicopter staff were involved in all  
27 aspects of field operations and support, including  
28 supply of ammunition, combat operations, casualty

1 evacuation (of troops) by helicopters and their  
2 treatment of sick and wounded troops at Panguna.  
3 I was personally aware of or personally participated  
4 in all the events and activities listed above, which  
5 involved BCL. I was aware of and participated in  
6 them as a result of my position as the Task Force  
7 Intelligence Officer in Panguna over May to  
8 September 1989.

9 7. As described above, and based on other forms of  
10 assistance from BCL and my experience as a PNG military officer, it  
11 is my opinion that the PNGDF operations at Panguna would have had  
12 significant constraints without BCL's active participation. From  
13 an operational perspective, BCL's involvement made all of the  
14 difference.

15 8. Through my own work as the Bougainville Task Force's  
16 Intelligence Officer and also as the Assistant Operations Officer  
17 based at Panguna, and being aware of the above BCL assistance and  
18 of the national debate going on in the country (within the context  
19 of the Bougainville crisis and its economic and social implications  
20 on the small under-developed country), I formed the following  
21 opinion and conclusions:

- 22 1. that the re-opening of the BCL's Panguna mine was  
23 critical to the economic survival of the country;
- 24 2. that the prosecution of military operations against  
25 the Bougainville Republican Army rebels and the  
26 Bougainville population (from where the rebels  
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- 1 emerged from) was a crucial mission which the  
2 military had to achieve successfully;
- 3 3. that the BRA rebels had to be defeated militarily,  
4 so that the Panguna mine could re-open;
- 5 4. that the military on Bougainville were under extreme  
6 pressure from the national Government leaders for  
7 the BRA to be defeated, so that the Panguna mine  
8 could be re-opened as soon as possible;
- 9 5. that the pressure exerted by the national Government  
10 leadership was a product of the extreme pressure  
11 from BCL management for the mine to be re-opened as  
12 soon as possible;
- 13 6. that the logistical assistance provided by BCL  
14 management at Panguna to the military were  
15 significant for combat support. They helped in  
16 significantly raising the combat power of the PNG  
17 military in its operations against the Bougainville  
18 rebels.

19  
20 The Bougainville Peace Process

21 9. During the period I was employed by the NIO, I attended  
22 many of the Peace Process Consultative Committee meetings in  
23 Bougainville between the PNG Government side and the combined  
24 Bougainvillean side. These meetings were held at the "working  
25 committee" levels and this Committee actually did much of the  
26 research and groundwork, including consultations between the two  
27 sides before the Leaders of PNG Government and Leaders of  
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1 Bougainville could meet to discuss matters of substance, and move  
2 forward after each meeting.

3 10. As a result of this work, I became very conversant with  
4 the Bougainville Peace Processes and contributed towards reaching  
5 the milestones we have reached so far. The Bougainville Peace  
6 Talks have concluded successfully. After some 4 years of extensive  
7 negotiations the Bougainville Peace Agreement was signed on 30  
8 August 2001.

9 11. As I understand it the litigation commenced in September  
10 2000. This was at a crucial stage in the finalization of the Peace  
11 Agreement and I do not believe it had any affect on the process. I  
12 have not heard any reports that the commencement of the litigation  
13 has in anyway protracted the peace process. Further, the Peace  
14 Agreement concerns three objectives that are unaffected by this  
15 litigation: to constitutionally guarantee a referendum on  
16 Bougainville Independence deferred for 10 to 15 years; the grant of  
17 autonomy on decisions relating to land, environment and foreign  
18 investment in the intervening period; and a plan for the disposal  
19 of weapons. In contrast, the litigation concerns the involvement  
20 of Rio Tinto and its affiliates in the past operation of the mine  
21 and supporting and maintaining the civil war. Rio Tinto has not  
22 participated in the peace process and they will have no role to  
23 play in the implementation of the Peace Agreement.

24 I, Yauka Aluambo Liria, declare under penalties of perjury  
25 under the laws of the United States that the foregoing is true and  
26 correct.  
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DATED: November 22, 2001, and signed at Port Moresby.

Yauka Aluambo Liria

Yauka Aluambo Liria